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Between ‘isses’ and ‘oughts’:  IR constructivism, Critical Theory, and the challenge 
of political philosophy.1 
 
‘Constructivist accounts of moral change as a form of real-world politics that both confronts other forms of 
power and embodies their own forms of power provides a way toward a synthesis of the “is” and the 
“ought”.’2 
 
Brian: “Why are women not allowed to go to stonings, Mum? 
Mum: “It’s written, that’s why!!!”3 
 
    
 
 Constructivism’s rapid consolidation as a research program in IR has been 
accompanied by reinvigorated attention to the centrality of the normative dimensions of 
interaction for understanding and analyzing the formation of social and political orders. 
In the context of availing itself more thoroughly of social theoretic or sociological 
conceptual and methodological inventories, IR theory has shifted under constructivist 
influence towards including a wider range of variables deemed relevant for understanding 
and explaining outcomes and trajectories, with the ascent of normative factors providing 
perhaps most readily a salient point of difference from previous interest- or power-
inflected explanatory models (see Wendt, 1999, Leander, 2011; Guzzini, 2000).4 To be 
sure, this expansion of the range of relevant variables has brought with it new 
methodological and theoretical challenges: Constructivism’s adding of analytically 
relevant factors and constellations has meant that what was a question of explanatory 
superiority between interest- (Neoliberalism) and power- (Neorealism) based variants of 
rationalist approaches, has been lateralized significantly. By including interpretivist 
                                                
1 My thanks to two anonymous reviewers, whose comments and suggestions have been very helpful in 
producing the final version. I am also very grateful to Roland Bleiker, who provided much needed feedback 
on earlier drafts, and Heloise Weber’s, whose criticisms and suggestions along the way have led to many 
improvements. 
2 Price 2008 A, 211. 
3 Monty Python, The Life of Brian. 
4 To be sure, the turn to normative theory had been prefigured, and in some cases explicated more 
comprehensively than in the context of the constructivist turn, in the wider context of the so-called Third 
Debate. Feminists in particular had taken interrogations of avowedly value-neutral social science in IR very 
far indeed (Tickner,1992; Elshtain, 1995); the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate had its spill-over from 
Political Theory and Political Philosophy into IR (for an early write-up, Brown 1992); Critical Theory had 
begun to make its mark and integrate normative concerns directly (Linklater, 1999; Neufeld, 1995). 
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elements, and stressing the role of ideas, identities and, latterly, emotions, constructivists 
have burdened their continuing penchant for explanatory (Hollis & Smith, 1990) social 
science with the additional methodological challenge of working out how the salience of 
respective factors is to be determined relative to the political phenomena under analysis: 
Under what circumstances, for instance, would it be plausible to explain outcomes as the 
result of the expansion of a normative consensus, rather than interest-based rational actor 
calculations?5 These and similar problems have, to be sure, led to efforts at clarifying 
more precisely how constructivist IR research is to negotiate the integration of different 
theorems; among these, for instance, questions regarding the explanatory limits of 
rationalist schemes still pertain in the context of substantive analyses. At the same time, 
mainstream constructivists have continued with the project of distancing such 
consolidations from the Scylla of “utopianism” on the one hand, and the Charybdis of 
“relativism” on the other.6 This maneuver has implications, which are not always very 
helpful at all. In what follows below, I take issue with the way in which mainstream 
constructivism engages with norms, and, more specifically, with the relationship between 
essentially behavioral accounts of norms (observations of social actions identified as 
‘norm-guided’) on the one hand, and the problem of the validity of norms (why should 
certain norms command respect, adherence, or deference) on the other.7 My primary 
interest is in reconstructing and criticizing a set of misapprehensions about the role of 
normative theorizing. As I will show, these misapprehensions are linked to constructivist 
delineation exercises, and have negative repercussions for any attempt at integrating 
concerns with the role of norms appropriately into the broader social theoretic project 
aimed at analyzing political orders and change.  
 
In order to do this, I am fortunate to be able to rely on a research programmatic 
statement, which was explicitly directed at exploring and constructing a closer link 
between accounts of the role of norms on the one hand, and normative theory on the 
other. Richard Price has articulated the need for the constructivist project to take this step 
                                                
5 For those constructivists, who remain invested in the analytical language of variability, this raises for 
instance the problem of whether normative factors are ‘background variables’, and, if so, how for instance 
change at that level, or interactions between different normative backgrounds are to be methodologically 
handled. 
6 My use of ‘mainstream constructivism’ basically follows the practices of IR constructivists themselves, 
who have stressed differences between, for instance, conventional (Hopf, 1998) and critical 
constructivisms. 
7 Somewhat different to the social constructivist mainstream, I consider the validity of norms to be 
intrinsically linked with the question of their (moral) content. A valid norm is one for which normative 
rightness is either claimed or implied, so that it would have to be redeemable, for instance through 
discursive justification. 
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(2008). A key objective for Price is to demonstrate the value of the underlying methods 
of constructivism for addressing normative concerns, and importantly, to elucidate what 
has ostensibly been a neglected appreciation; the relationship between normative theory 
and constructivism. Drawing on a rich list of examples, his aim is to elaborate what he 
sees are the central potential contributions which constructivist IR can make towards 
thinking about ethics in general, and theoretical accounts of norms in particular. The 
central claim of his exposition is that IR constructivism offers the resources for bridging 
the divide between accounts of ‘what is’, and accounts of ‘what ought to be’, a claim 
which he seeks to support by reference to ‘hard cases’. Such hard cases, the argument 
goes, demonstrate that where an ethical agenda cannot be fully realized due to real world 
constraints, it is still possible to assign ethical praise for actions short of fulfilling 
ethically maximalist goals.  
 Price’s article (and the book which followed it), though perhaps the only explicit 
research programmatic statement on the issue, is among a range of recent publications 
gesturing at the need to re-engage with normative concerns, and registering a more 
general commitment towards making such a re-engagement count for constructivist 
inquiry more centrally. In what follows, I want to take a closer look at the way in which 
normative concerns arise, are conceptualized, and integrated into political analysis from 
the perspective of constructivist approaches in IR. The latter, I want to argue, have too 
unreflectively borrowed in particular from sociological modes of inquiry, and have, 
regarding normative questions and problems, inherited, by and large without 
acknowledgement the latter’s limitations.  
  
 
 I start out by discussing some of these limitations in the broader context of a brief 
overview of constructivist contributions to normatively inflected analysis, with the aim of 
establishing the analytical costs of the persistent disengagement from questions of norm 
justification in favor of foci on norm effectiveness and institutionalization. I show that it 
is against this backdrop that Richard Price’s call for a rapprochement between 
constructivist theorizing about norms, and normative theory becomes intelligible.  
 In part two, I focus on Price’s argument directly, which serves as an exemplary 
statement of the problem-pressures under which the constructivist literature on norms 
labors. Here, I proceed in three steps.  
 Step one retraces the central points of Price’s argument, with the aim of 
establishing how he conceives of the task he has set himself. This reconstructive work 
will allow me to contrast the methodological premises from which Price advances his 
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argument with an account of what would actually be required methodologically in order 
to develop an approach capable of mediating empirical and normative approaches in the 
way he suggests. Despite a promising start, Price ends up with a conceptualization of the 
relationship between ‘isses’ and ‘oughts’ according to which the latter are all but reduced 
to the former. 
 For the second step, I then turn to Price’s hard cases, which arguably provide the 
key motivation for his attempt to demonstrate the contribution constructivism can make 
to normative theorizing. I show that Price here merely defers the problem of the 
methodological requirements of normative theory, and that his notion of a ‘moral limit’ 
grounded in empirical constraints is based on a fundamental misapprehension of the 
nature of normative theorizing. If, I argue, Price’s problems were set properly into the 
context of contending positions in political philosophy, he would have to make and 
defend in the mode of normative argument a choice of a political philosophic position, 
because only such a position can underwrite his intended goal of distinguishing morally 
progressive from regressive strategic action.  
  My third step then considers a possibility bracketed up to this point in my 
reconstruction; if Price’s account falls short of lifting normative theoretic considerations 
to the level of explicit inquiry and analysis in the way I suggest, is it plausible to see him 
implicitly arguing within a theoretical framework, which after all -- though undisclosed -- 
offers potentially a consistent answer to the challenge of normative theorizing? I identify 
consequentialism as a cogent normative theoretic supplement for Price’s concerns, but 
also raise some doubts about its capacity to meet the challenges faced by normative 
theorizing in a world political context.  
 The concluding part of the article revisits what is at stake in the underlying 
weaknesses of mainstream constructivism’s integration of norms and normative concerns 
by sketching some central misapprehensions held among constructivists about Critical 
Theory’s dealings with normativity. While conceptions of ‘regulative norms’ certainly 
have their appropriate place within a more inclusively construed field of social and 
political inquiry aimed in scope, scale and depth towards the ‘world’ (Walker, 2010), 
they are misleading guides to normative theory more generally when questions of validity 
and (moral) authority are considered as subject to relational justification (the latter, for 
instance, crucial for any conception of popular sovereignty; cf. Weber, 2007).   
   
 
 
Constructivism and norms: From social theory to sociology, avoiding normative 
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theory. 
 
 Mainstream constructivism made its headway into the discipline from the early 
1990s onwards, with Alexander Wendt’s article “Anarchy is what states make of it” often 
regarded as articulating a critical project directed at the hegemony of Neoliberalism and 
Neorealism in a distinctively different voice than those familiar from critical theoretic 
and post-structuralist contributions. Neorealism specifically, and the Realist tradition 
more generally remained the main focus of the attempt to introduce an alternative social 
ontological scheme, and still was the main target in Social Theory of International 
Politics. The context in which ‘Anarchy..’ appeared, was set by what had been  called the 
‘rationalism vs reflectivism’ debate. Reflectivist positions were seen, by and large, as 
critical of rationalist approaches (Neo-Neo), and to comprise feminist, critical theoretic, 
neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist or postmodernist approaches. Emblematic for this 
debate became the exchange around Robert Keohane’s presidential address at the ISA 
Annual Conference 1988, in which Keohane conceded the validity and importance of 
many of the reflectivist criticisms, but challenged the ‘critics’ to produce analyses based 
on their precepts, and to put the results up for testing. The constructivist project, at least 
in the direction it was given initially by Wendt, and subsequently in the broader via 
media context (and aside from Wittgensteinean variants such as Onuf’s and 
Kratochwil’s)8, ostensibly aimed to bridge the chasm, which had thus been defined in 
terms of what was at stake between rationalist and reflectivist approaches. To position 
constructivism as providing a bridge between rationalist and reflectivist accounts 
involved, for the most part, a prior commitment to social scientific objectivity, however 
modified, where this was understood to mean that researchers ought to abstain as much as 
possible from building specific normative preferences into their research designs or 
theories. For constructivists, this has constituted a major point of difference vis a vis  
‘reflectivist’ research programs, which continued to remain suspect, either due to their 
                                                
8 For this article, I set aside contributions to constructivist IR theorizing following in the footsteps of 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, of which Onuf’s and Kratochvil’s works present major 
instances in the discipline. These more epistemologically interested approaches present some cogent 
overlaps with my aim to present Critical Theory’s capacity to account for normative theory within a social 
theoretic project aimed at making sense of world politics, but there are also some salient differences with 
specific aspects of the particular language philosophic premises on which Wittgensteinean accounts draw. 
A discussion, if only a reconstructive one, which would do justice to what is at stake here is beyond the 
scope of this article. Suffice it to say, in this context, that (aside from its dialectical heritage more 
generally) the social theoretic scope of Critical Theory is more inclusive and requires more comprehensive 
engagements with non-linguistic aspects of social life. 
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comparatively strong normative commitments (consider constructivists’ wide-spread 
reservations towards ‘emancipatory theory’), or due to their – allegedly -- debilitating 
relativism (for instance, the pervasive unease over a ‘totalizing critique’ of normative 
claims).9 This exercise in differentiation, which, as we will see, also structures Price’s 
approach to the question of linkages between inquiries into norm efficacy, and normative 
theory, locates the constructivist research program methodologically in such a way so as 
to preclude substantive normative theoretic inquiry.  
 Hopf put this matter succinctly, suggesting that while conventional constructivists 
are interested in norms, they do not allow their research to be directed, or influenced by a 
‘normative agenda’ (1998; 183-85). In a similar vein, Adler suggests that constructivists 
are ‘interested neither in emancipation per se, nor exclusively in uncovering the power 
structures that affect the marginalized in history, but in providing better explanations of 
social reality’(1997; 333-34). It would seem, on the basis of this and other similar 
statements, as well as with regard to the general tenor of constructivist work (both, 
empirical and conceptual), that the constructivist position on questions of normativity 
quite simply aligns with a consistent sociological approach. Norms are seen as social 
facts, not dissimilar from any other social institution, and the latter are understood to be 
ideas given materiality in the context of collective enactment. When constructivists 
inquire into normative change in International Relations, they will hence prefer to engage 
in, for instance, ‘process tracing’, or comparable approaches to method through which the 
establishment of a ‘new’ norm as a social fact proceeds, following on from the initial 
formulation as a ‘desired’ norm, through various patterns of dissemination, to its eventual 
institutionalisation (for instance, as legal code).10 Neutrality on questions of content, 
which implies the suspension of normative judgment in the sense of questioning whether, 
and by what account or criteria, any norm under such investigation should be seen as 
desirable (and hence, for instance, command moral respect) is, in this context, considered 
                                                
9  These positions are routinely on display in contributions, which aim at outlining, clarifying and 
positioning a distinctive constructivist research program. Adler’s ‘Seizing the Middle Ground’ provides a 
neat summary of the delineation moves; Price and Reus-Smit (1998) sought to establish a clear, and 
workable distinction between constructivist and critical theoretic research, outlining what they saw as the 
weaknesses of the latter in the context of both, the problematic commitments towards emancipatory change 
of progressive modernist critical theorists on the one hand (Linklater, 1999), and the wholesale critique of 
normativity associated (rightly or wrongly) with post-structuralism on the other. For a critical account of 
norm-analysis in constructivism, see Landolt (2004). 
10 See, for instance, Keck & Sikkink (1998), or also Price (1998), where this story about the adoption, 
promotion and mainstreaming of normative premises is told with regard to ‘unconventional’ actors in 
international politics. These research programs dovetail nicely with the concerns constructivism has had in 
criticising Neo-realism; the context here is the end of the Cold War, generally referred to as somewhat of a 
come-uppance for the neo-Realist research program, which also coincided with the renewed interest in the 
concept and empirics of civil society (the latter remaining in focus, see Anheier, Glasius & Kaldor, 2001). 
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a clear strength, preserving a notion of ‘value free’ social science at least in a 
circumscribed sense. It rests on the methodological assumption, borrowed from 
disciplinary sociology, that the study of social facts such as norms can be undertaken 
with tangible and epistemic gain without taking into account those aspects, which are of 
interest in other disciplines or disciplinary contexts. In this sense, the questions regarding 
how to account for the validity of norms, which exercise, for instance, political 
philosophers, would be considered equidistant from the constructivist interest in norms, 
as is, in another direction, neuro-scientific research mapping the synaptic activities in 
human brains during moral evaluations.11 This obviously works as a delineation exercise, 
both with regards to research proclaiming normative commitments (for instance, to 
emancipatory politics), as well as to research projects framed in terms of mobilizing 
radicalized notions of contingency in order to unmask the language of normativity as the 
instantiation of particular forms of power (as in much research identified as post-
structuralist). On such an account, the proponents will have to invest intellectually in the 
cogency of the disciplinary division of labour, complemented, presumably, by a 
conviction for which warrants would have to be adduced from elsewhere that this 
division of labour still guarantees a cumulative increase in knowledge, rather than 
producing potentially contradictory outcomes, accounts, or problems. 
 This story is somewhat complicated by self-described constructivists’ practice of 
overstepping the boundaries of this delineation logic, manifestly in two directions, and 
tacitly in many more.  
 
Tacit transgressions 
 
 Tacitly, the mainstream constructivist project comprises un- or under-
acknowledged theoretical debts, which significantly complicate the claim that, rather than 
a substantive theory, constructivism in IR ought to be seen as an approach. 12  
Representative here, and relevant for our interest in negotiating normativity, is the 
problem of the undisclosed functionalist bias in constructivist appropriations of 
sociological idioms for the study of international relations and world politics. I have 
discussed aspects of this in the past (Weber, 2005; 2007), but would draw attention here 
                                                
11 The observation of the ‘firing-patterns’ is relevant to what is at stake in investigating aspects of moral 
evaluations, but the latter are inadequately understood when, for instance, reduced to events at the 
individual level.  
12 In what follows, I won’t be able to elaborate in depth on the quite specific ways in which sociological 
inventories have made their way into IR theory in the context of the shift to constructivism. Elements of 
what is at stake from critical perspectives can be gleaned, for instance, in B Herborth (2006); I. Neumann 
(2004); F Kratochwil (2000); and for some indications of my own views on this, Weber (2005). 
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to the quite distinct and specific ways in which functionalism seizes upon mainstream 
constructivism. The premise of functionalist analysis is the suspension of ontological 
questions (‘what is real/this’) in favor of explanations in terms of functions any given 
entity, object, or phenomenon performs for and in a wider context. In IR, such thinking 
has made inroads since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’ Theory of International 
Politics, which draws on Talcott Parsons’ theoretical explications of social systems (see 
Goddard & Nexon, 2005).13  Parsons had sought to improve on what he saw as the 
shortcomings of Max Weber’s sociological thought, in particular regarding the latter’s 
reliance on action theoretic premises for his account of social order. He developed a 
holistic theory of society, which nevertheless replicated the division of static from 
dynamic elements of the social world already introduced by Comte (Smith, 1973; 8). 
Dynamism (associated with action theoretic premises, and, substantively, for instance 
social conflicts) on this view would lead to reintegration, understood as the re-
establishment of systemic equilibrium. In this scheme, Culture (associated with the 
Latency function, or ‘pattern maintenance’) provides the repository of, for instance, 
values, which supply a society with resources for integration. When adapting this kind of 
sociological approach to IR, the centrality of ‘Culture’ as an integrative resource for 
systemic stability thus emerges as an urgent problem (see Goddard & Nexon, 2005, 38ff). 
In a sense, Waltz’ response to this was to render anarchy as the pattern maintaining 
feature of the international system, which could sustain a limited set of structural 
distributions (polarities), and accordingly compelled actor choices under the requirement 
of systemic reproduction. From the perspective of the Parsonian sociological project, 
then, anarchy as the permissive cause of war sits in the position of a cultural resource 
(pattern maintenance). Viewed, after all, from the vantage point of questioning the role 
played by functionalist social theory in constructivist IR theorizing, Wendt’s critique of 
Waltz’ approach, which raised the possibility of different cultures of anarchy (Wendt, 
1999) becomes intelligible as an entirely cogent response to the relatively arbitrary 
valorization of anarchy at the hands of Waltz.14 By positing culture (anarchy) as a social 
construct, and hence contingent, Wendt can make plausible the extent to which Waltz’ 
                                                
13 Theirs is an excellent exposition of the influence of Parsonian functionalism on Waltz’ Theory of 
International Politics. I depart from their interpretation, however, in suggesting here that Waltz does 
operate substantively with the notion of a ‘culture’, formally in the Parsonian sense, at the level of the 
international system.  
14 That this move also echoes Parsons’ own famous (if underappreciated) critique of Hobbesean schemes 
directed at demonstrating a direct conceptual flaw in attempts to derive a conception of political order from 
methodological individualist premises, simply compounds the cogency of Wendt’s arguments insofar as 
they provide an immanent critique of Waltz’ adaptation of functionalist sociology; it is, however, precisely 
an immanent critique!  
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scheme lacks the social ontological determination he had claimed for anarchy; but Wendt 
does so within the same Parsonian scheme.  In keeping with the structurationist premises 
taken over from Giddens (1986), Wendt can thus claim that different systemic cultures 
can be co-produced by the actors in the international system themselves (states), a move 
which consolidates constructivist pre-occupations with the role of ideas in international 
transactions cogently. 
 This upscaled scheme sees the Parsonian notion of the cultural system transposed to 
the level of international society (Waltz), and dynamised by an evolutionary logic 
permitting ‘cultural change’ (Wendt, but see also Adler, 1991). However plausible such a 
scheme may seem in the context of IR debates around the limits of rationalist analysis, 
though, it is riddled with undisclosed construction problems, and beset by what have 
elsewhere been staple criticisms of functionalist social theorizing.  
 Among the criticisms, suffice it to point to the inherent analytical conservatism 
involved in positing social wholes in consistency-driven action-orienting terms. In the 
case of institutional analysis, this has the effect of filtering normative content (or, rather, 
norms) in accordance with the contribution they make to maintaining or enhancing the 
institution relative to its purpose (in the case of the WTO, for instance, trade 
liberalization and the advancement of institutionalized certainties around tradable goods 
and services). Norms then appear only as stabilizing contributors to the reproduction and 
consolidation of the functions, which the institution performs. This echoes wide-spread 
criticism of functionalism’s inherent tendency towards incrementalism and conservatism 
according to which change is gradual, and core logics do not really change much at all 
(see Smith, 1973; see also Habermas, 1987). 
 Among the construction problems, perhaps the most problematic issue concerns the 
impoverished conception of culture, which flows directly from the upscaled use of 
Parsons’ latency function in both, Waltz’ and Wendt’s adaptations of functionalist 
sociology for the purpose of framing the international world. Parsons’ scheme, which is, 
to be sure, subject to the limitations of functionalism more generally, relied on rich 
repositories of cultural knowledge and competencies, which provided the resources for 
the development, differentiation, and integration of a range of ‘specialized’ social 
systems (legal, economic, etc). In the context of transposing the Parsonian latency 
function to the level of an integrative resource for the international political world, it is 
necessary to evacuate it of most of the registers of cultural resources usually invoked: 
Questions of language, cosmology, social identity, meaning generating activities, and so 
forth have to be suspended in favor of conceiving of a concept of shared culture thin 
enough to cover the plurality of actual cultures from the perspective of their functional 
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integration into a culture of the international. The legacy of this construction problem is 
twofold: on the one hand, it consolidates the difficulties IR has had with the question of 
cultural difference and its political significance (Inyatullah & Blaney, 2004) by 
committing constructivist social theorizing to an undeclared abstraction; on the other 
hand, it closes off pathways to inquiries into what kinds of cultural repositories may be 
available to actors in order to deal with intercultural relations, how these are processed, 
actualized or transformed, and on which resources and motivations they rely to do this. 
As we will see below, accounts of the latter have the tendency to burst asunder the 
premises of functionalist approaches, not least with reference to the question of 
normativity. 
 The emergence of a social turn in IR theorizing under the banner of constructivism  
thus labors in its mainstream version from the outset under limitations which stem from 
the sociological resources on which it has drawn, sometimes explicitly, but more often 
than not implicitly and without targeted theoretical and methodological reflection. 
  
Manifest supplementations 
 
 Manifestly, constructivists have, occasionally, either embraced teleological 
accounts of historical development, or have acknowledged the need to embrace particular 
normative positions, mostly with reference to specific research problems.  
 Teleologically, for instance, we have Wendt’s argument regarding the inevitability 
of a world state, which has at least parallels with Adler’s account of progress through 
social learning, in a scheme the latter describes as ‘cognitive evolution’ (Wendt, 2003; 
Adler, 1991). Though both these accounts are firmly couched within naturalist 
understandings of historical dynamic change (echoing both, Kant’s theory of history as 
‘nature operating behind people’s back’, and functionalist theories of ‘selection’), they 
operate with notions of progressiveness in such changes, which would ultimately have to 
be justified as compelling in the face of alternative scenarios. This would require 
criteriological supplementary arguments, and hence some engagement with normative 
theory, since any attempt at successfully distinguishing between progress and regress 
requires such criteria in order to be intelligible.  
 In opening towards normative theorizing, constructivist writers have begun to take 
notice of the limitations engendered by the focus on norms as nothing but social facts 
(understood in the sociological sense), and have gestured towards seeking to engage with 
questions of political philosophy, if, however, from a constructivist perspective. Price, 
who perhaps has gone the furthest in pursuing this line of inquiry, sees the contribution of 
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constructivist research on norms in explicating the empirical constraints with which 
normative ideals are confronted, with the aim of establishing a ‘middle ground’ between 
the ‘ought’ demands specified by political philosophic inquiries, and the ‘is’ constraints 
of real-existing obstacles to their realization. This would seem a cogent articulation of 
expanding the constructivist approach, but it lacks any degree of reflective engagement 
with the problems imposed by the strictures of the ‘bridge-building’ imaginary. While the 
goal is clearly to provide accounts of incremental moral and institutional change ‘in the 
right direction’ in the context of circumstances, which otherwise make the realization of 
maximalist ethico-political agendas difficult, or practically impossible, such arguments 
are nevertheless confronted with the logical problem of making moral judgement 
contingent on ‘empirical fact’, a problem which in the end can only be avoided, for 
instance, by proclaiming a ‘humanitarian ethic’ as the framing position for the arguments 
overall. The moral position, which sustains the notion of ‘progress’ under circumstances 
limiting ethical maximalism, is hence merely posited, replacing normative theory once 
more with normative ‘fact’, this time in the sense, almost, of a fait accompli.     
 It is unease with this that has lead to repeated attempts at engaging with normative 
theory proper from the perspective of what it may contribute to the constructivists 
research program. Elements of such movements have been with the development of the 
constructivist research program more or less from its inception. Irrespective of the 
tendencies, outlined above, towards delineating constructivist research methodologically 
and politically from critical theory and post-structuralism, aspects of both have been 
picked up repeatedly to deepen the constructivist account of the role of norms and 
normative change. From Wendt’s early work, aimed at establishing the importance of the 
world of ideas for understanding and analyzing international politics, through the 
discussions around arguing and bargaining, to more recent concerns with 
humanitarianism, and its hold on international institutional change, these signals have 
been clear. In this sense, then, Price’s 2008 article ‘Moral Limit and Possibility’, which is 
the most explicit attempt to map a research agenda for ‘bringing together’ IR 
constructivists’ achievements in studying norms and normative change empirically with 
normative theory and political philosophy, provides a good opportunity to investigate 
some of the problems this project runs into. His contribution, then, allows me to make a 
broader point about recent trends in constructivist research, because it articulates these 
sociological limitations inadvertently and comprehensively, and because it does so in the 
context of yet another attempt to keep the constructivist project at a distance from critical 
theoretic approaches.  
 The concerns I raise, however, should be seen as directed not only, or even 
 12 
predominantly, at Price’s argument, but rather at what is now an influential constructivist 
project in IR theory much more generally. I agree with Price that constructivist research 
has to address normative theory—hence putting up front questions of how norms, for 
instance, can be justified as ‘good’ (Price, 2008; 192). However, in ‘getting from A to B’, 
constructivist scholarship in IR all too frequently succumbs to mis-constructing the role 
and significance of normative theory in social and political analysis. In exemplary 
fashion, rather than taking on the challenge of engaging constructivist IR with normative 
theory, Price’s article treats, to some degree against his own good intentions, norms and 
moral change as sociological facts, without opening an inquiry into their genesis beyond 
recording that they are either generally (norms), or increasingly (moral change) observed 
by social and political actors. The purpose of registering my dissent is not to detract from 
the achievements of studying norm-observation from a social-behavioral perspective, but 
to suggest how – and, indeed, why -- methodological approaches of this kind run up 
against their limits when it comes to normative theory.15 
  
 
  
Beyond the naturalistic fallacy? Price’s approach to bridging the divide between 
‘isses’ and ‘oughts’. 
 
 A central and commendable concern of Price’s proposal is to move the 
constructivist agenda onwards by adding normative theory to what he claims has been its 
success in demonstrating empirically that norms matter in international relations. Doing 
so leads beyond an interest in the fact that norms matter, towards investigating which 
norms should command respect, and why. This requires, as Price himself states, an 
engagement with political philosophy, the discipline, which has been concerned with 
questions of ‘the good’ and ‘justice’ (Price, 2008; 193). His objective is twofold: On the 
one hand, he intends to move constructivism towards normative theory, thus enabling 
constructivist accounts of moral change to meet the challenge of providing a principled 
defense of moral progress. On the other hand, he seeks to defend the claim that 
constructivists’ strengths in empirical research can contribute to normative theorizing, 
particularly by raising to attention the real world constraints faced by agents advocating 
and advancing morally progressive objectives. As will become clear below, his argument 
                                                
15 Below, I follow Price in using ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ interchangeably, although this carries the risk of 
inaccuracies, as well as of furthering misunderstandings of political philosophic terminology. Doing justice 
to the latter is simply beyond the scope of this contribution. On some of these issues, see Weber (2002).  
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ultimately only addresses the concerns expressed by the second objective. Having framed 
the two objectives in terms of accounts of ‘what is’, covered by empirical social science 
of the type practiced by constructivists, versus ‘what ought to be’, as typically addressed 
by political philosophers, Price ends up collapsing the latter into the former, with the 
effect that his first objective fails comprehensively. In order to see how his argumentative 
strategy leads him into a methodological position from which the question of why a given 
act ought to be regarded as morally preferable can no longer be addressed, it is instructive 
to see the stages through which he develops his approach. 
 Price makes it clear initially that the task of normative theorizing is to produce 
defenses for certain norms or patterns of moral change ‘being, in fact, good’ (Price, 2008; 
192). According to Price’s exposition, the need to engage with normative theory arises 
for constructivism from its successes in demonstrating through empirical research that 
norms matter in world politics. These successes now raise the question of which norms 
ought to be considered as contributing to progressive moral change, a question, which 
inevitably engenders the task of providing justifications for moral assertions. Price 
understands the constellation he seeks to investigate in terms of what G.E Moore called, 
following Hume, the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ (Moore, 1992): According to Moore (and 
Hume), no account of what is allows for any conclusions about what ought to be, and the 
fallacy consists in thinking otherwise. For both, Hume and Moore, this actually meant 
skepticism towards any form of cognitive moral theory, consigning ethics effectively to 
the domain of opinions, sentiments, and value convictions for which there could be 
neither rational, nor reasonable warrant. However, for Hume’s critics, as for instance 
Kant (whom Price invokes for his argument), the naturalistic fallacy pointed in the 
opposite direction of the autonomy of moral thought as an intrinsic faculty of the human 
mind. It seems clear that Price would not want to frame his argument in terms of the 
skeptical position attributed above to Hume and Moore. His argument is rather informed 
by a position best described as ‘cosmopolitan humanitarianism’ (Price, 2008; 194), and 
hence does not involve in any form a radical challenge to the very possibility or 
desirability of normative theory as such. If Price then suggests that the central problem 
for normative theorizing revolves around the issue of the gap between ‘is’, and ‘ought’, 
he thereby affirms that the distinction between the two matters at least at one level 
substantively. Only on this premise is his goal of advancing constructivist research as a 
way to bridge this gap intelligible so that it articulates with his defense of ‘cosmopolitan 
humanitarianism’.  
 In affirming the ‘is-ought’ opposition, Price also positions different research 
programs relative to it, with critical theorists and ethicists occupying the terrain of 
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‘oughts’. Constructivist research on the other hand, according to his exposition, has had 
significant successes in registering that norms matter, and has done so through empirical 
research. Constructivism’s central ontological insights imply that norms can be treated as 
facts (‘mades’, to recall the Latin meaning of that word), and more importantly as social 
facts. From the perspective of empirical research programs, the inclusion of social facts 
as real (ontologically warranted) allows constructivist researchers to expand the range of 
permissible variables, so that not only ‘material’ ones (including ‘interests’) can be taken 
into account, but also ‘ideal’ ones, such as norms and values (see Wendt, 1999). 
Constructivists can thus add norm guided behavior to a range otherwise confined to ‘self-
interested’ ones, and pursue a project of demonstrating the efficacy of normatively 
inflected conduct in world politics by recording how norms in fact constrain and shape 
actors’ behaviors.16  
 However, that norms are in fact observed, or shape behavior, reveals little about the 
question of whether these norms are morally desirable. Once it is conceded that norms 
matter, the question of which ones command moral authority arises, as soon as moral 
change is under investigation. Thus, while empirical research could have easily 
demonstrated that there was, in fact, a social norm supporting slavery broadly, recording 
this provides no purchase on the question of whether the moral arguments supplied in 
justifying this norm were sustainable or defensible. From the ‘fact’ of slavery as a social 
norm, validated through empirical research, then, follows nothing about the question of 
whether it is a ‘good’ norm; neither does it follow from the fact that slavery was justified 
discursively by its proponents and beneficiaries, that these justifications would have to be 
acknowledged as morally convincing.17 With regard to IR constructivism’s empirical 
achievements, this latter problem, as Price points out very clearly, leads to the need for 
constructivists to engage with normative theory in order to begin to answer the question 
of which norms are actually ‘good’ (Price, 2008; 193). 
 Having thus first affirmed the is-ought distinction, Price then locates constructivist 
                                                
16 This idea of a ‘range-increase’, which provides for a consistent expansion of IR’s conceptual and 
analytical inventory by adding variables to hard-nosed social science analysis on the one hand, and 
contextual and delimiting arguments on the other, cogently reflects broader trends in Political Science (cf. 
the brief sketch of the rise of new institutionalism above; see pp. 3-4). Rational Choice approaches have, in 
response to critiques directed, for instance, at overly formalized accounts of actors, been moved towards 
more context-contingent explanatory strategies, with the effect of conceding ground to interpretivist 
epistemes. To the degree, however, that the social ontological move affirmed in IR constructivism 
generally (see Guzzini, 2000) in the broad sense of ‘a world of our making’ (Onuf, 1989) holds, such 
research strategic reconfigurations would require further reflection. On amendments to Rational Choice, 
see Hay (2006); for an indication on what’s at stake in terms of social ontology, see Weber (2012a). 
17 The critical social theoretic tradition, which mainstream constructivists tend to impugn for its alleged 
‘idealism’, builds here not on ‘concrete utopias’, but rather on the notion that relations of domination are 
ultimately not sustainable. See, indicatively, for instance Nandy (1987) 1-55. 
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research on norms in the realm of the ‘is’, before setting out to explore how constructivist 
research can nevertheless hope to build a bridge between the ‘is’ of empirical social 
science (as constructivism), and normative theory. However, in the next step, Price 
immediately starts to renege on the constitutive role he has given to the ‘is-ought’ 
distinction. For when he sets out to sketch what he thinks constructivist research can 
contribute to normative theory, he does so by establishing the premises 
 
 …that 1)normative positions are underwritten at some point by empirical assumptions or claims 
about the world; and 2) one conceives of the question of ethics broadly, as entailing not solely 
determinations of the good in the abstract, but as well questions of what should or can justifiably be done 
about realizing the good in any particular context.(Price, 2008; 193).  
 
 Both these premises are not particularly sharply drawn, since it is neither clear what 
Price means to imply by ‘underwritten’, nor how he conceives of the difference between 
the ‘good in the abstract’, and ‘good in context’. His remarks could be interpreted as 
opening an avenue towards ‘practical reasoning’ accounts of norms, leading towards the 
kinds of radical constructivist work of Onuf (1989) or Kratochwil (1991), but this is not 
the route Price takes in the subsequent argument. Beyond the ambiguities involved in the 
terminology, however, there is now a logical problem in his argument: The premises, in 
spite of the lack of clarity, are clear denials of his initial affirmation of the ‘is’-‘ought’ 
distinction. Remember that constructivism’s task was to get to grips with the ‘ought’, 
because empirical accounts of norm-inflected behavior as ‘fact’ don’t reveal anything yet 
about whether the norms in question are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The two premises, however, 
now restrict the initial scope of the inquiry already in such a way that the question of the 
role of normative theory in terms of the ‘ought’ can no longer seriously be considered. 
Now, ‘normative positions’ are seen to be contingent upon empirical assumptions, and 
the question of ethics involves stepping away from ‘determinations of the good in the 
abstract’. Both these assertions undermine the initial affirmation of the ‘gap’ between ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’. Price’s further argument bears out this flaw, because from this point 
onwards all works dealing in one way or the other with questions of political philosophy, 
from Linklater through Frost to Habermas and Campbell, are identified with an 
unsustainable, and essentially utopian idealism. As a result of this move, Price 
subsequently builds the ‘bridge’ between ‘isses’ and ‘oughts’ only and exclusively from 
the side of the former, identified with constructivist empirical research. At no stage in his 
article is the question raised anymore whether normative theory, initially still associated 
with providing the criteria with which to justify acts or arrangements morally, contributes 
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anything to the question of ethics, and if so, what. The framework of Price’s argument, 
then, contains the central contradiction: On the one hand, he wants to operate with the is-
ought distinction, because it is the only way in which he can make sense of 
constructivists’ empirical research projects’ acknowledged limitations with regard to 
justifying moral progress. On the other hand, he wants to suggest that the distinction is 
flawed, because all ‘normative positions are underwritten at some point by empirical 
assumptions’. It is the lack of attention to the latter, which in Price’s opinion render the 
works of normative theorists ‘abstract’, ‘idealist’, or ‘utopian’. 
 Instead of meeting the challenge of explicating the normative theoretic background 
for his argument, Price makes the move described above, which now no longer allows the 
methodological scope to deal with precisely the normative dimension of the question of 
how the issue of praise vs. blame is to be decided, and such a decision is to be justified. 
Now we are led to think that, methodologically, such justification depends on the 
empirical circumstances in such a way that it permits Price to speak of the ‘underwriting’ 
of ethics through empirical conditions.18 To be sure Price would probably want to deny 
that his argument is intended to resolve the tension between is and ought simply in the 
direction of the is. However, even if we concede that the basic idea here is to ‘build a 
bridge’ between the two, it surely matters between which two? Neither situational 
empirics, nor normative theories occur in the singular! Do specific ‘empirical’ situations 
require specific normative theories- in which case the ‘is’ determines the ‘ought’, though 
it would not be identical with it? Buying into the dualism between ‘utopian’, ‘abstract’ 
ethical reasoning in normative theory, and the constraints of what Habermas and Apel 
termed the ‘application oriented’ contexts, Price incurs at least methodologically the task 
of explicating how the two levels, which he must think of as relatively autonomous from 
one another, are to be mediated in order to permit the judgments he very clearly seeks in 
his guiding questions. By not raising this problem to the level of methodological concern, 
Price is forced to continue to play the empirical social science card against the perceived 
ethical maximalism of theoretical adversaries, without getting to grips conceptually with 
the task of mediating between moral reasoning and the constraints encountered in ‘real 
world’ contexts, though precisely this is what answering any of his questions would 
                                                
18 When drawing on Kant in support of his position, Price may have in mind the often cited passage from 
the Critique of Pure Reason, "Intuitions without concepts are blind; concepts without intuitions are empty." 
(Kant, 1986; Article 51). This, however, belongs not to Kant’s moral philosophy, but to his theory of 
transcendental apperception. Kant’s moral philosophy (in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant, 1997) is 
firmly anti-empiricist, based precisely on unconditional obligation—which expresses the opposite of what 
Price aims for with his attempt to formulate a theory of ‘moral limit’ with the help of empirical constraints. 
The formalism, which results from Kant’s rigorous defense of a deontological theory of morality, was, of 
course, one of the main targets of Hegel’s critical attention (Hegel, 1977). 
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require.  Instead of presenting and operationalizing connectivities with a normative 
theory of moral limit, Price ends up with an argument that mobilizes the imaginary of 
empirical hard cases (moral dilemmas, requiring, for instance, trade-offs between justice 
and security), which, in his understanding, constitute definitive limits to the ethical 
maximalism he diagnoses of various theoretical adversaries. However, setting the issue 
up this way leaves his argument consequently devoid of any notion of the normative 
theoretic inventory necessary to help with deciding, which trade-offs, or actions under 
constraints ought to be praised, and which ones ought to be condemned. 
 
 
Taking aim at critical theory: Hard Cases against ‘Idealism’ 
 
 If the preceding section is correct in identifying a basic problem in Price’s 
argumentative strategy, this section now raises the question all the more urgently of what 
motivates this strategy despite its obvious limitations. The text does not provide a clear 
answer to this question. However, it seems clear that a major motivation for Price consist 
in making sure that any encounter between constructivism and normative theory does not 
lead the former towards the ‘utopianism’ of abstract moral theorizing. Whether in his 
discussion of Linklater’s Transformation of Political Community (Price, 2008; 196), 
Frost’s Ethics International Relations (Price, 2008; 199), Habermas’ discourse ethics 
(Price, 2008; 201), or, finally, David Campbell’s writings on ethics and power, Price 
finds in the work of those engaged in normative theorizing invariably the trappings of 
‘paralyzing critique’ (Price, 2008; 209). In his representation, normative theory, 
understood as the concern with how to justify ethical statements or stances, remains 
indeterminate, unless disciplined by empirical analysis. This is expressed clearly, when 
he states, following his discussion of Frost: 
 
 It is here, then, where the kinds of empirical validation, including that notably practiced by 
constructivists among others, could help adjudicate between ethical accounts, at least forestalling premature 
descent into an endless relativist circle of ethical interpretation without hope of discrimination (Price, 2008; 
199). 
 
 
 To Price, it is ultimately empirical analysis that provides the criteria for 
adjudicating between rival normative theoretic approaches, which are otherwise 
suspended vis a vis each other as little more than opinions. At the same time, there is 
evidence of some discomfort on Price’s part with what could otherwise be a sanguine 
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endorsement of the empirical foundations of all proper ethical thought. Throughout the 
text, there are hints suggesting that maybe there is a point to pursuing questions of the 
‘ought’ in their own right after all, as when Price considers empirical research to provide 
accounts of the ‘conditions of possibility’ towards normative theories, rather than the 
content of the latter themselves. However, with regard to the latter, his argument returns 
again and again to the point that ‘rival’ normative theories can be validated only by 
empirical research.19   
 Price seeks to bring home this particular point through the discussions of ‘hard 
cases’ for ethics, which he construes as cases in which an engagement is called for with 
actors who themselves will not countenance any moral reasons as legitimate constraints 
on their intentions or conduct. To illustrate what he is after here, Price construes the case 
of ‘hypocrisy in aid of ethics’. The intention here is to secure the possibility of assigning 
ethical praise to certain acts of hypocrisy, where such acts are pursued as a strategy to 
promote ethical goals in specific empirical contexts: where those opposing an ethical 
agenda will be mere ‘rationalists’, seeking only the promotion of narrow self-interest 
without demonstrating any willingness to consider the moral implications of their actions, 
ethicists need strategies. Because, under certain circumstances, behaving hypocritically 
towards an unethical opponent can serve the advancement of an ethical agenda, there 
ought, to be scope for such behavior ‘in principle to be subject to moral defense’ (Price, 
2008; 204). On the face of it, at least, this seems to make sense, and if all critical theorists 
were in fact the kinds of idealists Price sees in them, dealing with hypocrisy in the pursuit 
of a greater good could be quite difficult for them.20 However, on closer inspection, 
Price’s example of the hard case of hypocrisy turns out to merely reproduce the 
argumentative and logical weaknesses already outlined above. The contradictions 
between the sociological approach to norms (as social facts), which the argument under 
investigation shares with mainstream constructivism in general, and the desire to produce 
a normative theory of moral limit, becomes obvious in the concluding section of the 
paragraph on hypocrisy. After concluding that ‘hypocrisy (…) hardly always needs to be 
condemned from a constructivist perspective’ because of its potentially conducive effects 
                                                
19 There is another, rather big problem resting in the notion that empirical validation somehow escapes 
perspectivity, or, to put it otherwise, that empirically validated situations are unambiguously ‘just so’ in a 
way that their script could be expected to compel acceptance by all, actors and observers, irrespective of 
their backgrounds. Clearly, constructivists with their invigorated attention to, for instance, identity, should 
be sufficiently equipped to avoid this problem. In his argument, however, Price seems to succumb to it; it 
should be clear that actors’ divergent perspectives and evaluations of shared social realities are at least 
potentially themselves morally significant. 
20 Note, however, that defenders of consequentialist ethics, for instance, would have no trouble with the 
task Price sets. See, eg. Brink (2006). 
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for a broader ethical agenda, Price concedes that ‘condoning it must be delicate, lest it 
contribute to a culture that undercuts the very ontological basis of moral change 
itself’(Price, 2008; 205). Precisely the latter task, however, would involve the 
development and justification of normative, non-arbitrary criteria with which good (here 
in the sense of ‘morally condonable’) hypocrisies could be ultimately discriminated from 
bad ones (those that ‘undercut’). The problem, which Price has such difficulties 
conceptualizing here, is a familiar one in political philosophy, and specifically within the 
branch of political philosophy with perhaps the closest affinities to Price’s preference for 
cosmopolitan humanitarianism. It can consistently be thought of in terms of the 
difference between categorical (you ought to realise x always) and hypothetical 
imperatives (under conditions c it is prudent to do y in order to realise x). Framing the 
issue like this serves to circumscribe precisely the problem of the ‘moral limit’ as Price 
seems to want to conceive of it. In distinction to his approach, however, there is at least a 
suggestion of how one can mediate a ‘principled’ approach with contextual constraints.21 
The difference is that such normative theories will deal, at the level of the categorical 
inquiry, directly with the question of why x should be realised (the question of 
justification). Rather than making a contribution to normative theory, then, the hard case 
of ‘hypocrisy’ simply reinforces the problem of the absence of any attempt to outline and 
justify the criteria by which the ethical desirability of hypocrisy under certain 
circumstances could or should be defended. 
 Price’s idea that the empirics of the situation determine the scope (‘how much 
moral content is realizable’) as well as the boundaries (‘when, and how, does an act 
become amoral, or immoral’) of moral action does then nothing for distinguishing 
between two different possible courses of action: The answer to the question why, of two 
possible actions A and B in situation S, A should be preferred morally, cannot be settled 
purely by reference to S, but relies on what gives either A or B as actions moral content. 
It turns out that without an account of the ought, which can supply substance to how the 
norms in question may be justified, empirical research into norm-guided behavior 
remains ethically blind. In the end, the question of the justification of moral claims is no 
longer alive in Price’s article. Instead, we are well into the world, where norms are social 
facts established by ‘popular acclaim’ (i.e. increasingly generalised acceptance and 
                                                
21 To be clear, my point is not that this conceptual scheme is sufficient in providing a ‘catch-all’ framework 
for negotiating the tricky issue of mediating the justification of moral principles with the demands of 
context-sensitive ethical agency; I am simply pointing out that it provides a much clearer outline for 
actually working this through, than is available in Price’s account, and, by extension, in the via media 
constructivist norms literature as a whole. 
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internalisation), and nothing else, despite concessions that some social facts are clearly 
less desirable than others. Gone is the ability to distinguish in terms of moral 
considerations between, for instance, the discourse of human rights, the diverse social 
and political imaginaries expressed through it by peoples struggling against exploitation, 
poverty, or oppressive regimes on the one hand, and the positive enforcement of human 
rights law on the other. When actors articulate struggles or policy proposals in the idiom 
of human rights, they do not unequivocally advance an already settled notion of how such 
human rights should be thought of. 22  Thought through, after all, empirically, the 
articulation of demands for justice in terms of human rights does not amount to a 
straightforward endorsement of the way in which human rights are often ordered into a 
hierarchy, for instance, along the continuum from ‘first order’ human rights (based on the 
negative liberties of the liberal canon), through second order accounts (comprising social 
and economic rights) to third order human rights (comprising notions of collective 
identity, or cultural expression and belonging; on this, see Vasak, 1977). 
 Any empirically rich reconstruction of the moral positions involved in such 
struggles, and any attempt to relate these, and the justifications involved in them on all 
the sides of often difficult, protracted conflictual relations to an account of moral 
progress, cannot be undertaken without explicating the elements of a normative theory 
according to which the actors’ moral positions can be reconstructed, understood, related 
to one another, and progressive engagements be distinguished from regressive ones.  
 
 
 
 
 
The possibility of undisclosed normative theory considered: would consequentialism 
work? 
 
                                                
22 To underline the relevance of this for political analysis in a world of bewildering pluralities in social and 
political organization, aspirations and struggles, consider the case of Cherokee Chief John Ross, who 
battled the ‘Indian Removal Act’ in Congress, and whose experience in invoking the Constitution in 
support of the Cherokee cause mirrors that of many other colonized peoples, in that it established precisely 
the hypocrisy of the particularist bias of a more universal appeal. See Perdue & Green (2007).  
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 Above, I have hinted at the possibility that a version of consequentialism could 
potentially resonate with some of the concerns Price directs his attention to. As would 
have become clear from the discussion so far, this is not a possibility he considers 
explicitly, although the way he sets up his problem of ‘hard cases’ would seem to 
strongly suggest considering a direct engagement with consequentialist thought. To see 
where this would leave us with regard to providing normative theoretic depth for 
constructivist inquiry, we can, however, consider some of the potentials and limitations 
of making consequentialist reasoning the linchpin of accounts of ‘moral possibility’.23  
On standard accounts, there seems to be an immediate fit between Price’s approach to 
‘hard cases’, and consequentialist ethics. The latter comprises axiological and normative 
components, stipulating a) that potential consequences of actions can be consistently 
ranked according to their value, and b) the rule that the moral thing to do is to choose that 
particular available course of action promising to bring about the highest ranked 
outcome.24 For instance, it would seem that lying to ‘Lord’s Resistance Army’ (LRA) 
militants about their post-conflict prospects is “the right thing to do”, because it outranks 
alternative courses of action (for instance, “do nothing”, or “issue edicts of moral 
condemnation”) in terms of its contribution to bringing about a state of affairs 
contributing to ending the conflict. As compelling as this may seem at first glance, 
committing the constructivist project to consequentialism as its normative theoretic 
supplement runs into a series of problems. Here, I only have room to consider two, which 
are, I think, particularly challenging.  
 The first limitation concerns the discourse of consequentialism as an ethical theory 
as such, and is raised for us when we consider what is arguably its central premise, 
namely agency. The agents of consequentialist reasoning are equally generally taken to 
be natural persons, from the perspective of whom particular acts are considered ethical if 
(and only if) they produce the best possible outcome. If states, indeed, ‘are people too’ 
(Wendt, 1999, 2004), this may suggest the possibility of scaling consequentialism up to 
                                                
23 It is, of course, impossible to provide a comprehensive account of the state of the art in consequentialist 
thought. For a brief indicative outline, see Pettit (1991); it is intrinsically interesting that consequentialism 
– uniquely among approaches to moral reasoning -- has engendered such a huge variety of versions that the 
mere task of surveying them faces a constant struggle to keep up with the arrival of ever further refined or 
redefined accounts. For an early, comprehensive critique of Consequentialism, see Grisez, (1978). 
24 I paraphrase (and simplify) here a useful, general definition used by J Suikkanen (2009); see p. 1.  
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the international; however, this is less than straightforward: When Tony Blair justified 
Britain’s support for the Iraq war, who, for the purpose of a consequentialist assessment, 
was the agent in question; was it Tony Blair (the natural person), Blair, the family 
member, the Prime Minister (of the UK), or the British State? Where agential scope is 
linked to institutionally created and sustained agential roles, this impacts on the kinds and 
range of consequences relevant to the assessment of an agents moral blame- or 
praiseworthiness. Since consequentialist arguments are focussed principally on ‘natural 
persons’ as the agents in question, an account of moral agency in international affairs 
would require at least a heuristic of the kinds of responsibilities social role-agencies 
could be ascribed for the purpose of consequentialist assessment (whether this concerns 
NGOs, states, or other corporate agents). 
 Even if we conceded that the problems raised by my first limitation could be solved 
by providing a consistently consequentialist framework for levels/qualities of moral 
agency, there would remain further, significant concerns. The second limitation, which 
circumscribes a whole set troublesome issues, reflects well-established critiques of 
consequentialism. The question is this: How much ‘homework’ can the agent in question 
be expected to do with regard to taking into account possible consequences of the course 
of action they are considering ?25 To return to the LRA example, it would be possible to 
advance consequentialist justifications for two diametrically opposed courses of action 
here: The first instance, which maps onto Price’s concern with ‘moral limits’, would 
involve precisely the justification of an act of hypocrisy in pursuit of an undeclared 
higher goal: Let’s lie to the LRA leadership about our intent to prosecute, in order to 
facilitate disarmament and a swifter end to violence. The ‘ends justify the means’, the 
good in question is the policy goal of pacifying the conflict, and the strategy should be 
considered moral (on Price’s account) because it leads to the right outcomes. The second 
instance involves consequentialist reasoning too, but here the argument vis a vis the same 
situation runs quite differently: Lying to the LRA leadership about prosecution has a 
delegitimating effect on the ICC and processes associated with it, reflects badly on the 
                                                
25 This raises many more points than I can discuss here. A typical concern here is the question of the benefit 
of ignorance (linked, for course, to mendacious abuse): The more simple-minded my comparison of 
possible results is held, the more outrageous things I get to justify; the more inclusive and ‘thick’ my 
account becomes, the harder the weighing-up of desirable outcomes gets, too. See Rudolph (2008), for a 
more elaborate account of this and other issues with consequentialism. 
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credibility and accountability of political interventions already under considerable 
legitimation stress, and is therefore likely to contribute to a sustained reduction in the 
actors’ ability to shape future, similar cases. According to this line of reasoning, the 
‘means detract from the ends’ in a no less consequentialist consideration of exactly the 
same course of action. In Price’s account, the latter line of argument is acknowledged, 
though subordinated to the former; but what warrant in moral reasoning would there be to 
do that? Answering this question leads swiftly onto the terrain of ‘competing ends’, the 
question of their objectivity (are they ‘the same’ no matter who looks at them how?), and 
a field in which supplementary moral arguments about ranking outcomes gain more and 
more traction, which look less and less like agency based consequentialism. It would 
seem, then, that – heeding, not least, Ruggie (1998), whose critique of neo-utilitarianism 
could be seen as raising strong doubts about consequentialist thinking – constructivists in 
search of normative theory would have good reasons to look beyond consequentialism. 
 
  
 
Critical Theory and the norm sociology of mainstream constructivism. 
 
 Above, I have outlined what I consider to be severe limitations of the ways in 
which mainstream Constructivism in IR has construed the link between the observation 
of normatively inflected action, and questions of normative theory. In the following part 
of my discussion, I want to pick up on the alternatives offered by Critical Theory (CT) in 
order to show, at least in outline, how it addresses the short-comings identified above. 
Engaging this affords me with an opportunity to flag up what I consider to be serious 
misunderstandings of CT on behalf of constructivists, but it also permits me to point to 
problems which critical IR theorists themselves have been less than clear about. In doing 
this, I can be neither as inclusive, nor as thorough as I would like to be. Recalling the 
account in the beginning of this article of constructivist differentiation practices, it would 
be more than apposite to demonstrate comprehensively in what ways critical theories 
(whether in their allegedly emancipatory, or relativist garb) are misapprehended or 
misconstrued. If I thus focus, in what follows, merely on aspects of CT indebted to the 
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legacy of Frankfurt School inspired social and political inquiry, I do so in not to suggest 
that it is in some way superior, more developed, or potentially paradigmatic when 
compared with other critical theoretic approaches. Instead, my purpose is to home in on 
the way in which CT addresses some of the concerns I have registered with regard to the 
particular commitments made in constructivist research on the role of norms.  
  
 The normative theoretic interest of the project of Critical Theory rests in its core on 
the critique of domination. With its legacy firmly in located in Hegelianism and 
Marxism, CT belongs with conflict theoretic approaches, even if it reneges on the 
centrality of class-struggle in the light of historical developments of the 20th century.  CT 
does not, as its constructivist critics sometimes assume, start from the perspective of a 
utopian ideal against which contemporary reality is measured and found wanting (see 
above). This is as basic as it is important for understanding what critical theorists are 
doing when they engage with normative theory. Instead of postulating unattainable 
ideals, CT has been concerned with explicating the resources (epistemic, practical, 
motivational) at the disposition of those systematically, or casually subjected to sustained 
forms of suffering, denigration, and/or exclusion. On such an account, the ‘grammar’ of 
social and political power is always normatively inflected (Honneth, 1995); the struggles 
of those excluded, denigrated or subjected to abuse have normative substance therefore 
not least because they constitute a challenge to prevailing normative arrangements, which 
either justify and legitimise the experienced offenses, or render them invisible and 
beyond reproach, reform, or resistance.26 Insofar as political institutions, conceived to 
provide social order, integration and the mediation of potentially conflicting interests, are 
to succeed, they must be responsive to such struggles, and, given that they sanction social 
and political norms, to the normative substance of such contestations as well. 
 Critique, on such a view, is determinate, relies on accounts of the experiences of 
domination and associated registers (for instance, denigration), but is conceived 
                                                
26 The Social Sciences have, of course, potentially exactly the same attachments to these normative 
arrangements, with the result that they become involved in the rendering of prevailing arrangements as 
either good, or factually unproblematic. I would like to emphasize in the strongest possible terms that such 
‘rendering invisible’ has absolutely nothing to do with the actual persistence of struggles and resistances, 
which go on irrespective of whether we recognize this, or not. Those suffering and battling against 
problematic arrangements do not need validation by Critical Theorists.  
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immanently, that is out of the actual relations, actor perspectives, and social-political 
practices themselves.27 Normative issues, concerns, and motivations arise as claims, 
expectations, or experiences of injuries where, when and insofar as people’s lives are 
implicated with one another in such contexts. Strategic action (contra some profound 
misunderstandings) is not somehow ‘legislated’ against, or subjected to generalized 
moral dismissal, but rendered contingent on justifications, consent, and obligations to 
take dissent seriously. 
 Taking this concern with the critique of domination as the central normative 
commitment of Critical Theory helps to provide the necessary contexts for its emergence 
and treatment in IR, but also serves to highlight some limitations in the ways in which 
this project has been taken up in the discipline. Here, I can only sketch some of the issues 
this raises. 
a) What is the relationship between norms as social facts and normative theoretic 
considerations? Above, we have seen that this problem constellation, which has been 
instrumental in mainstream IR constructivism’s construal of CT as dedicated to 
utopianism, has lead proponents of the former to misapprehend the substantive work 
normative theorizing does in any context in which the justification of norms is either 
required (for instance, epistemically), or demanded (for instance, politically). This 
imposes strictures on the social theoretic undercarriage of constructivism’s social 
turn, particularly with regard to its capacity to interrogate not just the efficacy of 
norms, but also their genesis. Where CT operates with the tension between the 
facticity and validity of norms as a constitutive problem (see Bonacker, 2000), and 
demonstrates in detail that the unconditionality of validity claims is an indispensible 
component of norm contestation (and hence of norm-formation), mainstream 
constructivists attempt to settle the question of validity essentially empirically: Norm 
entrepreneurs propose and promote a norm, its gradual acceptance leads to normative 
change, and subsequent to norm-internalization by a sufficient number of significant 
actors settles the norm as valid, proven by its capacity to circumscribe normalcy and 
deviancy. From the perspective of a theoretical project oriented towards the critique 
of domination, this practice of collapsing the question of validity into the account of 
                                                
27 See, for instance Honneth (2001). 
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the facticity of norms is immediately problematic: disregard for substantial questions 
around justification commits such sociological approaches to blindness regarding 
their potential collusion with practices of domination. CT, by contrast, is oriented 
towards reconstructing the conceptual and experiential resources on which actors 
draw in raising, defending, and contesting validity claims. In the case of the work of 
Habermas (1987,1994), this reconstruction was informed significantly by the 
linguistic turn. In The Theory of Communicative Action, as well as in other works 
(see, indicatively, 1990), Habermas is guided by the question of how it is possible for 
actors looking to coordinate action to come to an understanding about action-goals, 
and the means to achieve these. The purpose is to recover “the pragmatic 
presuppositions of mutual understanding” (Hoy & McCarthy, 1996; 39). By locating 
the resources for raising, contesting and settling normative claims in language and 
communication, the project outlined in the Theory of Communicative Action shifts 
normative theorizing into a postmetaphyiscal and comprehensively intersubjectivist 
framework. In social theoretic terms, this reconfiguration enables a reconceptualised 
(intersubjectivist), non-individualist action theory as an access route towards a critical 
appraisal of systems-rational contingencies and crisis tendencies. With this 
revalorization of action theory, and its reconceptualization on substantively different 
grounds than those invoked for actor centred approaches based in methodological 
individualism, a genuine alternative is offered beyond the constrictions of the 
structure-agency scheme, and its suspension between the two conceptual poles of 
determinism and voluntarism (see Weber, 2012c).  
b) In the brief discussion of the limits of functionalism at the beginning of this article, I 
have already signalled that the appearance of the concept of anarchy in the place of 
Parsons’ culture (latency function), transposed to the level of the ‘international 
system’, which informs both, Waltz’ neorealism, and Wendt’s move to a social theory 
of IR, comes packaged with a thin, but significant institutional correlate. Anarchy, 
either as the permissive cause of war (Waltz), or as the permissive cause of 
potentially qualitatively altering acculturation (Wendt), is the resource for social 
agents marked by statehood. It is clear that this move amounts to an abstraction 
within an abstraction: Anarchy in the position of a global cultural system providing 
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for the reproduction of the ‘international’ is too empty to correlate cogently with 
Parsons’ thick conception of culture as, among other things, a repository of values; 
this marks the first, the framing abstraction. The conception of the state as the agent 
capable of modulating behaviour on the basis of the resources provided by the 
anarchic cultural system of the international constitutes the second abstraction, no 
doubt cogent to the first, but no less arbitrary. Both abstractions together set the 
agenda clearly: By making the analysis begin from the vanishing point of a 
desubstantialized, minimalist conception of culture (anarchy), whose value horizon is 
shared by agents called states, the scene is set for research into practices and activities 
which thicken the abridged conception of culture as a value resource. As cogent as 
this scheme may appear at first glance, the rescaling of the Parsonian account of 
culture immediately raises construction problems for the intended theory of norm-
acculturation, which animates mainstream constructivist research programs (Keck & 
Finnemore, 2001): Where Parsons’ latency function comprised comprehensive value 
horizons as a ready resource for systems-differentiation and coordination, one which 
he took as given, IR would require a plausible generative theory of the gradual 
emergence of a value repository, since the latter can not be assumed as pre-
established. The constructivist social turn in IR, enabled not least by the lopsided 
approach to questions of normative theory, and its commitment to an externalist 
account of norms as social facts, has as yet not taken on such and related challenges. 
Neither, however, have many proponents of CT in IR. The latter have left the field of 
social theoretic considerations largely to mainstream constructivist and their 
sociological interlocutors, focussing instead mainly on epistemic questions around 
sites of communication in international relations (see, e.g. Risse, 2000; Deitelhoff & 
Mueller, 2005). This amounts to a widespread neglect in the IR discourse around CT 
of the latter’s quite specific social theoretic contributions generally, and its critique of 
sociology in the mode of ‘behaviour observation’ in particular.28 As a consequence, a 
severely truncated understanding of CT has become established in IR, enabling 
inadvertently routine dismissals by detractors such as those reconstructed above. This 
constellation has also led to a pervasive marginalisation of the question of what some 
                                                
28 For a recent example of this, see Honneth (2010). 
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of the limitations of CT in the study of world politics might be (Weber, 2012b). 
c) The commitment of CT to the critique of domination, its investment in conflict 
theory, and its configuration of empirically rich, practice-oriented theorizing, while 
certainly not beyond significant need for further reflection (and provincialization!; see 
Chakrabarty, 2000), rest on the outlines of an alternative social ontology. While it 
would be beyond the scope of this article to attempt to do justice to this claim, I want 
to at least briefly render it plausible. The modern tradition of political theory, of 
which Hobbes’ work is often seen as a framing text, sets out to explicate the 
conditions of social and political order and authority with reference to problem of 
liberty (Skinner, 2008), and locates the latter as the property of individuals. The 
various formulations of social contractual responses to framing the issue like this (in 
absolutist, or liberal forms) spell out justifications for the trading off of liberties-
based claims in return for order, stability, and the policing of transgressions. 
Accepting this scheme allows one to play through the different variants marked at 
opposite ends of the spectrum from liberalism to a collectivistically (mis-)understood 
republicanism. An alternative arises, when liberty is understood not in terms of a set 
of properties accumulated at the level of the individual, but as co-produced; to put 
this simplistically: ‘we are only as free as we make each other’ (to be sure, also with 
the reverse implication!).29 This latter conception, perhaps at least potentially more 
constructivist than the one bequeathed to us by the many variants of theories of 
natural rights, corresponds with the notion of communicative freedom underlying the 
heterodoxies of CT from Hegel through Marx to the 20th century variants. It enables a 
very different approach to identity formation (see, e.g. Habermas’ interest in Mead, 
1992: 149-204), and opens up the problems of institutional ordering from a 
perspective quite different to mainstream theories (see, e.g. Honneth, 2002; 2011). It 
is also cogent to the conflict theoretic orientation of the project, and the correlated 
requirement to understand institutional arrangements as conflict management efforts 
generated out of, and in response to claims and counter-claims, which are, after all, 
                                                
29 The critique of Liberalism implied in this draws on Hegel’s exploration of the limits of natural law 
theory. On this, explicitly, and with a cogent exploration of Hegel’s own inconsistencies regarding the 
problem of intersubjectivity, see Theunissen (1991). Recently, this has been worked through in much more 
detail, and with a view to reinvigorating the project of a critical theory of society in Honneth (2011). 
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not devoid of a substantive normative grammar. Returning to the example of slavery, 
this leads, for instance, to a much needed reappraisal of widely held believes that the 
gradual abolishment of European slavery was the result of a norm cascade begun by 
Wilberforce and mainstreamed through British parliament. From a CT perspective, 
framed, after all, by the commitment to conflict theory, the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (if 
such language is needed) are, of course, the struggling slaves of Haiti themselves 
(James, 1980). 
 Together, these brief sketches should help to underscore the point that the resources 
available from CT for thinking about normative theory, social and political change, and 
the relationship between theory and practice constitute some real and tangible 
alternatives, not least because they have been conceptually refined in the contexts of 
debates with precisely those contending approaches, which mainstream constructivists 
turn to for their social theory of IR. However, as already indicated, CT itself is in need of 
much further work, and, to be sure, provincialization (Weber, 2012b). Its eurocentrism, 
though often acknowledged (Dallmayr, 2002) requires more careful, systematic 
reconstruction, and sustained dialogic encounters with different cosmological and socio-
political registers. Neither of these objectives have received much attention in IR’s CT, 
and they have only had marginal treatment in CT outside the disciplinary fold. 30 
Poststructuralist work is sometimes doing better there, but it is in the broader context of 
the decolonizing literature that such issues are being addressed in vigorous and often 
pathbreaking ways. 31   To be sure, CT is not alone in facing these problems. 
Constructivists more generally do too, the same ones, and, as we have seen above, 
perhaps some more. As societalisation proceeds to change social and political 
arrangements, reaching through the architecture of the international, deploying formal as 
well as informal social forces, and creating more complex patterns of exclusion within 
the rise of socially produced global risks, the struggle over norms, their justification, and 
their impacts will intensify. For Critical Theory, domination is a precarious form of social 
order; resistance against domination involves mobilisation in terms of a moral grammar 
                                                
30 In this context, Critical Theorists’ omission of the challenges posed emblematically by Frantz Fanon’s 
The Wretched of the Earth (2001), with its thoroughly convincing insistence on the agency of those 
rendered as the patients of the march of history, is as striking, as it is inexcusable. 
31 Fortunately, there is some excellent work in IR in this vein; see indicatively Crawford (1997, 2002), 
Grovogui (1996, 2002), Shilliam (2009, 2011), Inyatullah & Blaney (2004), Pasha (2005), H Weber (2007). 
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(Honneth, 1995). Injustices (as a subset of normative concerns) register as claims to 
advance more just affairs, and the small contribution Critical Theory makes is to render 
this explicit in the context of working out the contours of thoroughly inter-subjectivist 
normative theory (Forst, 2011; Honneth, 2011). 
  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 In this article, I have taken issue with the way in which mainstream constructivism 
in IR has approached the study of the role of norms in International Relations. Initially, I 
reconstructed some of the contours of the specific pathways taken in the context of 
mainstream constructivism’s social turn, drawing attention in particular to functionalist 
proclivities, and sociological predispositions, which it has promoted and bedded down, 
sometimes inadvertently. This reconstruction served as the backdrop for a discussion of 
how the question of normative theory eventually returns to a literature strongly invested 
in studying the impact, salience, and constitutive importance of norms.  
 Drawing on the programmatic statement of intent issued by Richard Price (2008), 
which identified and consolidated the split between norms as empirically observable, 
social facts on the one hand, and questions of normative rightness (justification) on the 
other, I have demonstrated that the attempt to arrive at an account of ‘real world’ 
constraints to alleged ethical maximalism, in which the former discipline the latter, fails 
to satisfy basic logical requirements of normative theorizing: Bridges cannot be built 
from ‘isses’ to ‘oughts’, at least not where the presumed ‘safe ground’ of the ‘isses’ itself 
suggests the bridgeheads for the ‘oughts’. In the context of the theoretical construction 
problems which Price’s project runs into, I showed that his failure to break through to 
normative theorizing proper, is cogently linked to the norm-sociological understanding to 
which he, together with the mainstream constructivist project as reconstructed in the 
earlier parts of the article, remains committed. Having identified the possibility of 
reconstructing some of Price’s arguments and cases in terms of consequentialist political 
philosophy, I raised two objections to the latter, which were to indicate what kinds of 
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limitations such accounts would run into. Consequentialism, I argued, is unable to deliver 
a satisfying normative theoretic framework for the kinds of problems Price’s hard cases 
raise.  
 As my argument shows, the task embraced by Price, of bringing mainstream 
constructivism and its empirical study of norms together with normative theory, has not 
been accomplished. My brief exposition of Frankfurt School influenced critical social 
theorizing suggests that mainstream constructivists’ investment in distancing themselves 
from the alleged dangers, pitfalls, or fallacies of ‘critical’ (read ‘value-based’) approaches 
have prevented a more thorough engagement with significant, important, and convincing 
resources for approaching this task. In the register of a ‘moral grammar of social 
struggle’ (Honneth, 1995),   social theory, normative theory, and critique can, at least in 
principle, be approached with the participants’ perspectives in mind. Under the guidance 
of a relationally inflected theory of intersubjectivity, the commitment in CT to dialogism, 
which underpins also the focus on communicative action, can set out normative theory in 
terms of the resources available to the actors themselves. Although there are limitations 
in this project, too, and there is much work to be done to make good on its goals (not 
least around the critique of domination), it is in much better shape on the task of 
mediating accounts of norm-effectiveness and norm-justification than mainstream 
constructivism. 
 Constructivists identifying moral dimensions of social and political interaction, too, 
must know somehow and by some account, wherein the morally reprehensible aspects of, 
for instance, hypocrisy lie, and by appeal to what sorts of ‘higher’ values its strategic use 
may or may not be justifiable. To fall back on an answer such as the one given by Brian’s 
Mum (‘because it’s written!!!’), invoking the facticity of norms, as so much of the 
constructivist literature seems to want to do, is then to simply fall short of lifting the 
problem to the level of normative theoretic inquiry. 
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